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Arild Engelsen Ruud

Arild Engelsen Ruud

Arild Engelsen Ruud is Professor of South Asia studies at University of Oslo. He writes on South and Southeast Asia (India, Bangladesh and the Philippines) with an emphasis on popular perceptions of democracy, blasphemy, dynastic politics and political leadership. His publications include (co-author or co-editor) Mafia Raj (Stanford UP 2018); South Asian Sovereignty (Routledge 2019); Outrage (UCL Press 2019); Masks of Authoritarianism (Macmillan 2021) and The Long Reach of the Strong Arm (Macmillan 2026). He currently leads a research project on political participation and leadership in Asian democracies.

My field setting

I have mostly conducted fieldwork in lower middleclass neighbourhoods that belong to what Harriss-White has called 'middle India', such as Beleghata in Kolkata, but extending to Mohammadpur in Dhaka and the city of Barishal (both in Bangladesh). These are residential-cum-local business neighbourhoods, replete with inexpensive eateries and hotels, small companies with crowded offices, street-facing shops and in the back small factories that produce items for local consumption. The best places for informed conversation are the tea stalls to be found every few hundred meters and that constitute affordable hangouts where locals gossip over the latest news while enjoying a cigarette.

My key research questions

My interest is in how individuals navigate interaction with the state, how narratives influence perception of legitimate authority, and how power is exercised. This is particularly salient in cases where the state is represented by predatory actors. Focus is on the local and the historical emergence of intermediaries with political connections but few if any formal powers. For the citizen, this has created a situation in which the state's ways of functioning is intimidating as well as incomprehensible. How does this work out in practice and how can we conceptualise such a situation?

My research findings

My research shows that the local state in both India and Bangladesh as represented by its elected politicians has entered into alliances with representatives of criminal groups to constitute an extractive system that feeds off government budgets. There are other agents in this system (an echo of what Ledeneva calls 'sistema' in Russia), including local businessmen, representatives of the media as well as non-elected representatives of the state – bureaucrats, police officers, and judges. The elaborate and intertwined networks of illicit deal-making centre on the political leader and draw sustenance from crucial alliances with actors able to generate funds. In the case of local politics, the crucial actor for funds is the local contractors. Housing, bridges, school supplies and medical equipment are secured through contracts paid for by municipality or city corporation at the helm of which is the elected leader. The conundrum or indeed irony is that the elected leader's position is secured through elections and distribution of forms of patronage with a larger construct of patriarchal protection.

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